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INTRODUCTION
The president of my former club . . . said I left because I
got more money in England, that I didn't care about the
shirt. I said: "Is there one player in the world who signs for a
club and says, Oh, I love your shirt?" . . . He doesn't care.
The first thing that you speak about is the money.'
Assou-Ekotto's statement sums up the familiar maxim,
money talks. In many contexts, society is largely at ease with this
truism. However, there are certain drawbacks to this condition,
particularly in the world of sports.2 Research shows that fans
value uncertainty in results, and may lose interest in a sport if
one team is too dominant, thus creating predictable outcomes.3
Teams with less money find it difficult to compete with teams
that have relatively more money to spend on the services of top-
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University. The Author would like to thank James Keyte for his advice and insight. He
would also like to thank his friends, family, and the Volume XXXV International Law
Journal Board for its support during the drafting process. Finally, he would like to thank
the Volume XXXVI International Law journal Board, especially Tonya Rodgers, for its
incredible hard work and patience throughout the editorial process.
1. David Hytner, Benoft Assou-Ekotto: 'I Play for the Money. Football's not my Passion,
GUARDIAN (U.K.), Apr. 30, 2010, at 8, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/football/
2010/may/01 /benoit-assou-ekotto-tottenham-hotspur.
2. See Frederick Wiseman & Sangit Chatterjee, Team Payroll and Team Performance
in Major League Baseball: 1985-2002, 1 ECON. BULL. 1, 3 (2003) (asserting that there is a
strong relationship between team performance and the average salary that the team
pays to its players); see also Roger Bennett, A Precarious Premier League, ESPN (July 19,
2012), http://www.espn.go.com/sports/soccer/story/Jid/8181 5 27 (noting Guardian
soccer writer David Conn's belief that clubs today win because of money being spent on
teams, rather than coaching and local players).
3. See Daniel A. Rascher & John Paul G. Solmes, Do Fans Want Close Contests? A Test
of the Uncertainty of Outcome Hypothesis in the National Basketball Association, 2 INT'L J.
SPORT FIN. 130, 137-38 (2007) (explaining that fans want games in which the outcome
is uncertain); see also Stefan Szymanski, Income Inequality, Competitive Balance and the
Attractiveness of Team Sports: Some Evidence and a Natural Experiment from English Soccer,
111 ECON. J. F69, F69 (2001) ("It is widely accepted that a degree of competitive
balance is an essential feature of attractive team sports.").
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level athletes. 4 This problem is particularly critical in the Union
of European Football Associations ("UEFA") Champions
League because of the way the league is structured.5 Twenty-
eight of the thirty-two teams that have either won or been
runner-up of the Champions League between 1997 and 2012 are
among the twenty most valuable soccer teams in the world.6
In the United States, most popular professional sports have
dealt with this issue by implementing salary caps: a maximum
amount of money that can be spent on player salaries.7 Salary
caps have a positive effect on competitive balance, and provide
leagues with financial stability.8 In Europe, however, salary caps
4. See, e.g., Scott Butler, New York Yankees ... Just Buying Another Championship,
BASEBALLREFLECTIONS.COM (June 22, 2010), http://www.baseballreflections.com/
2010/06/22/new-york-yankees-just-buying-another-championship (lamenting the
New York Yankees' ability to outbid all other teams for players due to their massive
financial advantage); Joe Posnanski, World Series Lament for Indian Fans: What Might
Have Been, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Oct. 28, 2009), http://www.si.cnn.com/2009/
writers/joe-posnanski/10/28/lee.sabathia/index.html (opining that the Cleveland
Indians could not keep top level talent due to salary pressure from wealthier teams).
5. See generally Competition Format, UEFA, http://www.uefa.com/
uefachampionsleague/season=2012/competitionformat/index.html (last visited Apr.
26, 2012) (explaining that the Champions League is comprised of the thirty-two
European club teams, which are determined by applying a specific formula); UEFA
Member Associations, UEFA, http://www.uefa.com/memberassociations/index.html (last
visited Apr. 26, 2012) (listing the fifty-three European member associations of the
Union of European Football Associations ("UEFA"), including the Champions
League).
6. Compare Soccer Team Values: Business on the Pitch, FORBES,
http://www.forbes.com/soccer-valuations/list (last visited Apr. 26, 2012) (listing the
twenty most expensive soccer teams in the world and their current values), with
Football's Premier Club Competition, UEFA, http://www.uefa.com/uefachampionsleague/
history/index.html (last visited Apr. 26, 2012) (indicating each runner-up under
"Winners" heading).
7. See Thomas M. Schiera, Note, Balancing Act: Will the European Commission Allow
European Football to Reestablish the Competitive Balance That it Helped Destroy?, 32 BROOK.J.
INT'L L. 709, 722 (2007) ("All four major professional sports leagues in the United
States have some form of salary cap . . . ."); see also Paul D. Staudohar, Salary Caps in
Professional Team Sports, 3 COMP. WORKING CONDITIONS 3, 4 (1998) (characterizing
salary caps as a quid pro quo to free agency, and giving a brief description of salary caps
in each of the major American professional sports).
8. See Christine Snyder, Note, Perfect Pitch: How US. Sports Financing and Recruiting
Models Can Restore Harmony Between FIFA and the EU, 42 CASE W. RES.J. INT'L L. 499, 519
(2009) (suggesting that salary caps can restore competitive balance in sports); see also
Richard Alm, A Salary Cap of Some Sort is in Baseball's Future, DALLAS MORNING NEWS,
Aug. 24, 2002, at IF (positing that salary caps promote the financial stability of sports
leagues).
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have not yet been tested in a meaningful way.9 In 2010, UEFA
approved a salary cap that went into effect in 2012, and will be
reviewed during the 2013-14 season.'0 In the absence of a salary
cap, UEFA teams will continue to pay higher salaries than they
can sustain over the long term, which will ultimately lead them
to financial ruin."
Part I of this Note details the background of antitrust law in
the United States, competition law in the European Union, and
their application to sports. In particular, it examines salary cap
schemes. Part II discusses the issues regarding the legality of
salary caps under both US antitrust law and EU competition law.
Part III proposes the course of action that the European
Commission should follow in its inevitable confrontation with
the salary cap structure recently implemented by UEFA.
I. KNOWING YOUR COMPETITION: ANTITRUST
BACKGROUND IN THE UNITED STATES
AND THE EUROPEAN UNION
Part I lays out the background of antitrust law in the United
States, as well as its European counterpart, competition law. Part
L.A discusses the Sherman Antitrust Act and its application to
sports. Part I.B addresses the different approaches US courts use
to analyze antitrust cases. Part I.C explores European Union
competition law and its application to sports. Finally, Parts I.D
and I.E detail the history of salary caps in the United States and
9. See Johan Lindholm, The Problem With Salary Caps Under European Union Law:
The Case Against Financial Fair Play, 12 TEx. REV. ENT. & SPORTS L. 189, 190 (2011)
(noting that salary caps are uncommon in European sports); see also Chris Deubert,
Putting Shoulder Pads on Schleck: How the Business of Professional Cycling Could Be Improved
Through a More American Structure, 37 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 65, 108 (noting that in 2011,
UEFA would become the first European sports league to unilaterally implement a
salary cap).
10. See Financial Fair Play Regulations Are Approved, UEFA (May 27, 2010),
http://www.uefa.com/uefa/aboutuefa/organisation/executivecommittee/news/
newsid=1493078.html (reporting the passage of a salary cap provision in UEFA)
[hereinafter FFP Regulations Approved]; see also Natalie L. St. Cyr Clarke, The Beauty and
the Beast: Taming the Ugly Side of the People's Game, 17 COLUM.J. EUR. L. 601, 622 (2011)
(noting that the regulations come into effect in 2012).
11. See Financial Fair Play Explained, UEFA (June 2, 2010), http://www.uefa.com/
uefa/footballfirst/protectingthegame/financialfairplay/news/newsid=1494481.html
(noting the heavy aggregate losses of Europe's top teams) [hereinafter FFP Explained];
see alsoJason Clout, Field of Dreams, AUSTL. FIN. REV., Aug. 5, 2011, at 35 (pointing out
the heavy financial losses incurred by many European football clubs).
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the European Union, respectively. Part I.D focuses on
professional basketball and football in the United States. Major
League Baseball ("MLB") and the National Hockey League
("NHL") are not included because MLB was granted an
idiosyncratic exemption from antitrust law, and the NHL has a
much more recent history of salary caps.' 2
A. Antitrust Law in the United States
1. The Sherman Antitrust Act
In the United States, the Sherman Antitrust Act provides
the foundation of antitrust law. Passed in 1890, the law makes
" [e]very contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise,
or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the
several States, or with foreign nations . . . illegal."' 3 Although
the literal text suggests a broad application, Congress intended
that Section 1 of the Act only prohibit unreasonable restraints of
trade.14 Thus, the elements of an antitrust violation are: "(1) a
combination or conspiracy formed by two or more entities; (2)
an unreasonable restraint of trade or commerce by the
combination or conspiracy; (3) the interstate nature of the
restrained trade or commerce; and (4) general intent."' 5
To determine whether there has been a violation of Section
1 of the Sherman Act, courts apply one of two different analyses:
either the per se standard or the rule of reason standard. 6 The
12. See Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 282-83 (1972) (holding that baseball was to
remain exempt from antitrust law, while other sports were not); Rick Westhead, N.H.L.
Players Overwhelmingly Approve Labor Dea4 N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 2005, at D1 (dating the
earliest National Hockey League ("NHL") salary cap to 2005).
13. Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1890).
14. See Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 723 (1988) ("Since
the earliest decisions of this Court interpreting this provision, we have recognized that
it was intended to prohibit only unreasonable restraints of trade."); see also Christopher
M. Brown & Nikhil S. Singhvi, Antitrust Violations, 35 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 467, 468 (1998)
(citing the Supreme Court's holding that only unreasonable restraints of trade are
prohibited).
15. Brown & Singhvi, supra note 14, at 469 (describing the elements the
government must show to prove a criminal violation of the Sherman Act); see Sherman
Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1890).
16. See Brown & Singhvi, supra note 14, at 470-72 (identifying the two analytical
approaches); Shawn Treadwell, An Examination of the Nonstatutory Labor Exemption From
the Antitrust Laws, in the Context of Professional Sports, 23 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 955, 963
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practices normally associated with the creation and operation of
professional sports leagues are not subject to per se analysis.' 7
Per se analysis is applied when a restriction is so anti-competitive
that further analysis is unnecessary.' Professional sports are,
however, subject to the rule of reason standard.' 9 Under this
standard, courts look at the anti-competitive effects of the
activity in question to determine whether the restraint is
unreasonable.20
2. Exemptions for Sports from the Sherman Act
The US Supreme Court's perspective on the application of
the Sherman Act to sports has evolved over the last century.
Initially, the Court ruled that Section 1 of the Act did not apply
to professional sports, holding that sports did not affect
interstate commerce, and were therefore a purely local issue.2'
This decision, however, was made in 1922 when professional
football and basketball were still in their infancy, and baseball
was the only one of today's four major professional sports in the
(1996) (noting that certain types of agreements are per se illegal, while others, like
labor agreements in sports, are analyzed under the rule of reason approach).
17. See NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 100-01 (1984)
("[T]his case involves an industry in which horizontal restraints on competition are
essential if the product is to be available at all."); Robert E. Freitas, Overview: Looking
Ahead at Sports and the Antitrust Law, 14 ANTITRUST 15, 17 (2000) (documenting courts'
recognition that without such restraints, the product could not exist at all).
18. See NCAA, 468 U.S. at 103-04 (denoting when per se analysis should be used);
see also Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 886 (2007)
(applying per se analysis where a restraint "lack[s] ... any redeeming virtue") (internal
quotations omitted).
19. See, e.g., Law v. NCAA, 134 F.3d 1010, 1018-19 (1998) (applying rule of reason
analysis to a sports-related antitrust case); M&H Tire Co. v. Hoosier Racing Tire Corp.,
733 F.2d 973, 980 (1984) (refusing to employ per se analysis because the rule was
"promulgated in a sports self-regulation context").
20. See State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10 (1997) ("[U]nder [the] 'rule of
reason,' . . . the finder of fact must decide whether the questioned practice imposes an
unreasonable restraint on competition . . . ."); see also Brown & Singhvi, supra note 14,
at 472 (describing how courts apply rule of reason analysis).
21. See Fed. Baseball Club of Balt., Inc. v. Nat'l League of Pro Base Ball Clubs, 259
U.S. 200, 208-09 (1922) (finding that baseball games, even when played by teams from
different states, were still intrastate in nature); Michael J. Kaplan, Application of Federal
Antitrust Laws to Professional Sports, 18 A.L.R. FED. 489, § 2(a) (1974) ("Initially, federal
courts held the view that professional sports were not engaged in interstate commerce,
and that the federal antitrust laws were therefore inapplicable to them.").
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United States that enjoyed any real popularity.22 Over time,
however, baseball and other professional sports leagues
developed into booming interstate industries, prompting the
Supreme Court to revisit its 1922 decision.23 In 1972, the Court
decided that, although baseball would remain exempt from the
Sherman Act, " [o] ther professional sports operating interstate-
football, boxing, basketball, and, presumably, hockey and golf-
are not so exempt."24
This decision did not, however, deliver a knockout blow to
professional sports leagues, as they could still be exempted from
antitrust law.2 5 Two ways in which professional sports leagues
may be removed from the scope of the Sherman Act are
through the statutory and non-statutory exemptions from
Sherman Act liability.26 The statutory exemption, found in the
1914 Antitrust Act, says that antitrust laws are not to be
"construed to forbid the existence and operation of labor . . .
22. See Fed. Baseball Club of Balt., Inc., 259 U.S. at 208 (holding that baseball is an
intrastate activity not subject to antitrust law); Chronology of Professional Football,
NFL.CoM, http://static.nfl.com/static/content/public/image/history/pdfs/History/
Chronology-2011.pdf (last visited July 26, 2012) (noting that it was not until 1920 that
an organizational meeting for a professional football league was first held); Histoy of
Basketball, THE PEOPLE HISTORY, http://thepeoplehistory.com/basketballhistory.html
(last visited July 26, 2012) (describing the early years of collegiate basketball in the
early 1900s and early professional leagues in the 1930s). The four major American
professional sports are basketball, baseball, football, and hockey. See Timothy G.
Nelson, Flag on the Play: The Ineffectiveness of Athlete-Agent Laws and Regulations-and
How North Carolina Can Take Advantage of a Scandal to Be a Model for Reform, 90 N.C. L.
REv. 800,817 (2012) (listing the four major professional sports in the United States).
23. See Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 282-83 (holding that although baseball
would remain exempt from the Sherman Act, other sports would not).
24. Id. at 282-83 (removing baseball from the purview of antitrust law, while still
applying antitrust law to all other sports). Most scholars believe that baseball's
anomalous exemption is illogical and against the prevailing law. See Nathaniel Grow, In
Defense of Baseball's Antitrust Exemption, 49 AM. BUS. L.J. 211, 212-13 (2012)
(acknowledging the general agreement among scholars regarding baseball's
exemption from antitrust law).
25. See, e.g., Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231, 235-36 (1996) (defining the
non-statutory labor exemption as an exemption from antitrust law); Connell Constr.
Co., Inc. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local Union No. 100, 421 U.S. 616, 622 (1975)
(establishing that there is a statutory labor exemption from antitrust law which "allows
unions to accomplish some restraints").
26. Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1914) (removing labor organizations
from antitrust law); Connell Const. Co., 421 U.S. at 622 ("[A] proper accommodation
between the congressional policy favoring collective bargaining . . . and the
congressional policy favoring free competition ... requires that some union-employer
agreements be accorded a limited non-statutory exemption from antitrust sanctions.").
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organizations, . . . nor shall such organizations, or the
members thereof, be held or construed to be illegal
combinations or conspiracies in restraint of trade, under the
antitrust laws."27 The non-statutory labor exemption flows from
the Supreme Court's holding, in Connell Construction Co., v.
Plumbers & Steamfitters Local Union No. 100, that to best achieve
congressional policies in the field of labor law, "some union-
employer agreements [must] be accorded a limited non-
statutory exemption from antitrust sanctions." 8
The Court's Connell ruling is particularly relevant to
professional sports leagues in which players have joined labor
unions, including the National Basketball Association ("NBA"),
National Football League ("NFL"), and the NHL.29 Over the
years, courts have held a panoply of activities to be exempt from
antitrust law under the statutory and non-statutory labor
exemptions.s0 These included fixed salaries for developmental
squad players in the NFL, age restrictions on the NFL draft, and
equalization rules in the NHL.3'
B. Rules of the Game: Analyses Used by the Courts
Part I.B addresses the different analyses US courts apply in
antitrust cases. First, Part I.B.1 identifies and explains per se and
quick look analyses in depth. Then, Part I.B.2 details the rule of
reason analysis. Finally, Part I.B.3 considers how courts have
27. 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1914).
28. Connell Const. Co., 421 U.S. at 622 (creating the non-statutory labor exemption
in some cases); see Brown, 518 U.S. at 250 (holding that the National Football League's
("NFL") actions were protected by the non-statutory labor exemption).
29. See generally What We Do, NBPA.COM, http://nbpa.org/what-we-do (last visited
July 26, 2012) (enumerating the ways in which the union represents the players in the
National Basketball Association ("NBA")); NFL Mgmt. Council & Nat'l Football
League Players Ass'n, 2006 Collective Bargaining Agreement Preamble, at ii ("[T]he
National Football League Players Association ... is recognized as the sole and exclusive
bargaining representative of... players in the NFL. . . .").
30. See Brown, 518 U.S. at 250 (exempting fixed salaries for developmental squad
players in the NFL); Clarett v. NFL, 369 F.3d 124, 139-40 (2d Cir. 2004) (holding that
age limitations in the NFL draft were exempt from antitrust law under the non-
statutory labor exemption).
31. See Brown, 518 U.S. at 250 (holding that the non-statutory labor exemption
applied to fixed salaries for NFL development team players); Clarett, 369 F.3d at 139-40
(exempting age restrictions on the NFL draft); NHL v. NHL Players Ass'n, 789 F. Supp.
288, 289 (D. Minn. 1992) (holding that certain NHL rules were exempted from
antitrust law under the non-statutory labor exemption).
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applied rule of reason analysis using examples like fixed salaries
and product licensing.
1. Per Se and Quick Look Analyses
If no exemptions apply, and the Sherman Act is triggered,
courts will apply one of three standards of review: per se, rule of
reason, or quick look analysis.32 Deciding which standard of
review to apply can be a complicated issue for courts.33 The per
se rule is rarely used by the courts, and "applies only in those
cases where the business practice in question is one, which on its
face, has 'no purpose except stifling of competition."'34 A few
examples of activities that could trigger per se analysis are
horizontal agreements to boycott competitors, to divide
territories, and to fix prices.3 Courts therefore generally decline
to apply per se analysis in sports-related antitrust cases.36
Similar to the per se rule is quick look analysis. Under this
standard, a court will find a violation of the Sherman Act when
"an observer with even a rudimentary understanding of
economics could conclude that the arrangements in question
32. See Agnew v. NCAA, 683 F.3d 328, 335 (7th Cir. 2012) (enumerating the three
standards of analysis); Katherine Kaso-Howard, American Needle, Inc. v. National Football
League: justice Stevens' Last Twinkling of an Eye, 44 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1163, 1169-71
(2011) (describing the three approaches to antitrust analysis).
33. See Timothy A. Cook, Pharmaceutical Patent Litigation Settlements: Balancing
Patent & Antitrust Policy Through Institutional Choice, 17 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L.
REV. 417, 436 (2011) (pointing out the difficulty courts face when trying to decide
which standard of review to use); see also Lawrence A. Sullivan, The Viability of the Current
Law on Horizontal Restraints, 75 CALIF. L. REv. 835, 891 (1987) (discussing the
importance of determining which standard of review to apply).
34. Eichorn v. AT&T Corp., 248 F.3d 131, 143 (3d Cir. 2001) (quoting White
Motor Co. v. U.S., 372 U.S. 253, 263 (1963)); see Kaso-Howard, supra note 32 at 1170-71
(characterizing courts as being hesitant to apply per se analysis in all but the most clear-
cut cases).
35. See Kaso-Howard, supra note 32, at 1170 (listing examples of activities that
would trigger per se analysis); see Jacobs v. Tempur-Pedic Int'l, Inc., 626 F.3d 1327,
1334-35 (2010) (giving examples of when a court may use per se analysis).
36. See Freitas, supra note 17, at 16 ("[I]t is now settled that the practices typically
associated with the organization of professional sports leagues and other organizations
such as the NCAA are not subject to the per se rule."); see, e.g., NCAA v. Bd. of Regents
of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 99-100 (1984) (holding that per se analysis was
inappropriate in a sports-related case).
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have an anticompetitive effect on customers and markets."37
Such a finding is rebuttable if the defendant can demonstrate a
plausible "pro-competitive" justification for the restraint.38 If the
court accepts the pro-competitive justification, it will review the
case under full rule of reason analysis.39 Otherwise, with no
mitigating pro-competitive justifications, the restraint will be
condemned as an antitrust violation." Quick look analysis is
applied in situations "where per se condemnation is
inappropriate, but where 'no elaborate industry analysis is
required to demonstrate the anticompetitive character' of an
inherently suspect restraint."41
2. Rule of Reason Analysis
The rule of reason is the most commonly used standard.42
The Supreme Court presumptively applies the rule of reason
test, which requires plaintiffs to demonstrate the
37. Cal. Dental Ass'n v. F.T.C., 526 U.S. 756, 770 (1999); see NCAA, 468 U.S. at 109
(holding that no market analysis is required to demonstrate anticompetitive nature of
"a naked restriction on price or output").
38. See United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 669 (3d Cir. 1993) ("If a plaintiff
meets his initial burden of adducing adequate evidence of market power or actual anti-
competitive effects, the burden shifts to the defendant to show that the challenged
conduct promotes a sufficiently pro-competitive objective."); see also James A. Keyte,
American Needle: A New Quick Look for Joint Ventures, 25 ANTITRUST 48, 51 (2010)
(describing generally the process which a quick look analysis follows). To be "pro-
competitive", a restraint must benefit competition. See THE INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK
ON PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT OF COMPETITION LAW 42 (Albert A. Foer & Jonathan W.
Cuneo eds., 2010) (defining the term "pro-competitive" justification").
39. See Deutscher Tennis Bund v. ATP Tour, Inc., 610 F.3d 820, 832 (3d Cir.
2010) ("Where procompetitive justifications are proffered, their logic must be assessed
and rejected in order to avoid reverting to full-scale rule of reason analysis."); see also
Keyte, supra note 38, at 51 (noting that if the court accepts the pro-competitive
justification, it will then review the case under rule of reason analysis).
40. See Brown Univ., 5 F.3d at 669 ("If no legitimate justifications are set forth, the
presumption of adverse competitive impact prevails and 'the court condemns the
practice without ado.'") (quoting Chi. Prof'1 Spots Ltd. P'ship v. NBA, 95 F.3d 593, 674
(7th Cir. 1996); see also Keyte, supra note 38, at 51 (indicating that if the court rejects
the pro-competitive justification, it will then condemn the restraint as a violation of
antitrust law).
41. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d at 669 (quoting NCAA, 468 U.S. at 109).
42. See Daniel Doda, Antitrust Concerns in the B2B Marketplace: Are They "Bricks and
Mortar" Solid or a "Virtual" Haze?, 27 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1733, 1745 (2001) ("[Tlhe
rule of reason is the standard most often used."); see also Matthew J. Jakobsze, Kicking
"Single-Entity" to the Sidelines: Reevaluating the Competitive Reality of Major League Soccer
After American Needle and the 2010 Collective Bargaining Agreement, 31 N. ILL. U. L. REV.
131, 138 (2010) (asserting that courts favor rule of reason analysis for sports leagues).
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unreasonableness and anti-competitive nature of the restraint in
question.43 The rule of reason asks whether the restraints are
unreasonable, and thus violate the Sherman Act." In 1978, the
Supreme Court synthesized the analysis to a question of whether
"the challenged agreement is one that promotes competition or
one that suppresses competition."45 The defendant must then
rebut the plaintiffs claim by demonstrating a pro-competitive
objective.4 For example, the defendant might argue that in the
absence of the restriction, it would be impossible to sustain the
line of business at all.47
As applied to sports-related antitrust cases, one popular
justification has been the promotion of competitive balance
within the league. For example, in American Needle v. NFL, the
Supreme Court acknowledged the importance of competitive
balance in professional football.48 In subsequent rulings, courts
43. See Texaco Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1, 5 (2006) ("[T] his Court presumptively
applies rule of reason analysis . . . ."); Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S.
717, 726 (1988) ("[T]here is a presumption in favor of a rule-of-reason
standard. . . .").
44. See Denver Rockets v. All-Pro Mgmt., Inc., 325 F. Supp. 1049, 1062-63 (C.D.
Cal. 1971) (noting that the Sherman Act applies only to unreasonable restraints of
trade); see alsoJohn R. Gerba, Comment, Instant Replay: A Review of the Case of Maurice
Clarett, the Application of the Non-Statutory Labor Exemption, and its Protection of the NFL
Draft Eligibility Rule, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2383, 2384-85 (2005) (defining the rule of
reason as prohibiting only unreasonable restraints on trade).
45. Nat'l Soc'y of Prof'l Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 691 (1978) (citing
Chi. Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918)).
46. See Brown Univ., 5 F.3d at 669 ("If a plaintiff meets his initial burden of
adducing adequate evidence of market power or actual anti-competitive effects, the
burden shifts to the defendant to show that the challenged conduct promotes a
sufficiently pro-competitive objective."); see also Kaso-Howard, supra note 32, at 1170
(explaining that if the plaintiff can show that the restraint suppresses competition, the
defendant must then show that it is promoting a pro-competitive objective).
47. See NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 103 (1984)
(refusing to condemn a restriction by the NCAA because without it, televised football
games could not exist); see alsoJames T. McKeown, The Economics of Competitive Balance:
Sports Antitrust Claims After American Needle, 21 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 517, 530 (2011)
(articulating an example of a pro-competitive justification).
48. Am. Needle, Inc. v. NFL, 130 S.Ct. 2201, 2217 (2010) ("We have recognized,
for example, 'that the interest in maintaining a competitive balance' among 'athletic
teams is legitimate and important.'") (quoting NCAA, 468 U.S. at 117); accord Brady v.
NFL, 644 F.3d 661, 664 (8th Cir. 2011) (noting that maintaining competitive balance is
a legitimate purpose).
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have extended the logic beyond professional football to include
professional basketball.49
3. Putting the Rule of Reason in Play: Yazoo Smith, Practice
Squad Players and Product Licensing
The rule of reason first entered into the arena of
professional sports when former University of Oregon defensive
back James "Yazoo" Smith sued the NFL in 1970.501 Selected by
the Washington Redskins in the first round of the 1968 draft,
Smith played one unremarkable season before suffering a
career-ending neck injury.5' The Redskins paid him US$19,800,
the amount he would have earned had he played out the
remainder of his two-year contract.52
Two years later, Smith sued the NFL, arguing that the draft
constituted a group boycott, which denied him his opportunity
to negotiate a contract that reflected his open-market value.5 3
The district court found that the draft was a per se violation of
antitrust law, and awarded Smith more than a quarter million
dollars in damages.54 On appeal, the DC Circuit Court held that
the draft was not a per se violation, as its intent was "not to
insulate the NFL from competition, but to improve the
entertainment product by enhancing its teams' competitive
49. See Chi. Prof'l Spots Ltd. P'ship v. NBA, 95 F.3d 593, 603-04 (7th Cir. 1996)
(accepting that competitive balance is needed for the NBA to provide high-quality
entertainment); Robertson v. NBA, 389 F. Supp. 867, 892 (S.D.N.Y. 1975)
(acknowledging the need for competitive balance for the survival of professional sports
leagues, including the NBA).
50. Smith v. Pro Football, Inc. (Smith II), 593 F.2d 1173, 1174, 1182 (D.C. Cir.
1978) (detailing the parties and their claims and noting the decision to apply rule of
reason analysis to player restrictions).
51. Smith II, 593 F.2d at 1176 (summarizing Smith's short-lived NFL career);
History of the NFL Draft, NFL.COM, http://www.nfl.com/draft/history/
fulldraft?season=1968&round=roundl (last visited July 30, 2012) (summarizing the
history of the NFL draft).
52. Smith II, 593 F.2d at 1176-77 (framing the particular facts of the underlying
lawsuit).
53. Smith v. Pro Football, Inc. (Smith 1), 420 F. Supp. 738, 741 (D.D.C. 1976)
(arguing that "because of the draft ... he was unable to negotiate a contract reflecting
the free market or true value of his services").
54. Id. at 744 ("This outright, undisguised refusal to deal constitutes a group
boycott in its classic and most pernicious form, a device which has long been
condemned as a per se violation of the antitrust laws.").
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equality."55 Having determined that the draft was not a per se
violation, the court proceeded to analyze it under the rule of
reason standard.56 Under this standard, the court found that
competitive balance was not a valid justification for such a
restraint.57 The Smith ruling stood for nearly two decades
without challenge until DC Circuit Court Judge Wald's 1995
dissent in Brown v. Pro Football signaled the beginning of a shift
in the judiciary's views on competitive balance.5 8 In Brown,
practice squad players sued the NFL over the League's unilateral
imposition of a US$1,000 weekly salary. 9 The players claimed
that the fixed salary violated the Sherman Act, accusing the NFL
of price-fixing.co The circuit court held that the non-statutory
exemption applied, but otherwise upheld the district court's
decision.61 As such, it declined to analyze the issue under the
rule of reason. 62
In her dissent, Judge Wald expressed the belief that the
non-statutory exemption should not apply.63 She proceeded to
note that competitive balance on the field may have been a
justifiable pro-competitive benefit.64 The League had "colorably
argued [ ] that the wage restraint imposed on rookie and first-
year nonroster players was necessary to enhance on-field
'competitive balance' among teams, thereby making NFL
55. Smith II, 593 F.2d at 1179.
56. See id. at 1182 (recognizing that the court's relative unfamiliarity with the
issues prevented it from declaring the restraint automatically illegal, and that rule of
reason analysis was required instead).
57. See id. at 1186 ("[T]he NFL teams are not economic competitors on the
playing field, and the draft, while it may heighten athletic competition and thus
improve the entertainment product offered to the public, does not increase
competition in the economic sense of encouraging others to enter the market and to
offer the product at lower cost.").
58. See Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 50 F.3d 1041, 1059 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (Wald,
J., dissenting) (expressing a belief that competitive balance might be relevant).
59. See id. at 1045 (summarizing the facts of the underlying case).
60. Id. at 1047 ("[Players . . . brought a class action lawsuit against all 28 NFL
clubs and the NFL itself . . . alleging that the defendants engaged in price-fixing in
violation of the Sherman Act. . . .").
61. Id. at 1045 ("[W]e hold that the District Court erred in rejecting the
appellants' claim that the nonstatutory labor exemption shields them from liability in this
case.").
62. See id. (refusing to address a number of challenges to the District Court's
ruling because the non-statutory exemption was found to apply).
63. See id. at 1058 (Wald,J., dissenting).
64. See id. at 1059 n.3 (WaldJ., dissenting).
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football a more attractive and economically competitive
entertainment product. "6
The issue of competitive balance in professional sports
finally made it to the nation's highest court in the 2010 case
American Needle v. NFL.6 6 From 1963 to 2000, National Football
League Properties ("NFLP") licensed multiple vendors to
manufacture and sell team apparel, including a company called
American Needle.67 In 2000, the NFLP stopped granting non-
exclusive licenses, and instead granted a single, ten-year
exclusive license to Reebok International.68 The license
commissioned Reebok to manufacture and sell all headwear for
all of the teams in the NFL and ended American Needle's
license.69 In response, American Needle filed an antitrust suit,
alleging that this agreement violated the Sherman Act.7 0  .
Although the issue was a narrow one, the Supreme Court
still contemplated competitive balance's role in sports antitrust
analysis.7' Just before the end of the opinion, the Court noted
that competitive balance was a legitimate and important interest,
which may survive rule of reason analysis.72 Ultimately, however,
it did not decide whether it would survive as a matter of law.7 3
The general rule announced by the Court was that " [w] hen
'restraints on competition are essential if the product is to be
65. Id.
66. See Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat'I Football League, 130 S.Ct. 2201, 2217 (2010)
(holding that competitive balance was a pro-competitive justification). The Supreme
Court had addressed the issue of competitive balance once before, but only in amateur
sports. See NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 85 (1984) (holding
that competitive balance was not a pro-competitive justification).
67. Am. Needle, 130 S.Ct. at 2207 (describing the agreement between the National
Football League Properties ("NFLP") and apparel vendors).
68. Id. (explaining that NFLP granted Reebok International Ltd. an exclusive ten-
year license to manufacture and sell trademarked headwear for all thirty-two teams).
69. Id. (giving details about Reebok's agreement with the NFPL).
70. Id. (documenting American Needle's response to Reebok's exclusive license
agreement with the NFPL).
71. See id. at 2208 ("[W]e have only a narrow issue to decide: whether the NFL
respondents are capable of engaging in a 'contract, combination... , or conspiracy' as
defined by §1 of the Sherman Act . . . ."); see also McKeown, supra note 47, at 519
(observing that the Court had a narrow issue before it, but "devoted its penultimate
paragraph to discuss competitive balance").
72. See Am. Needle, 130 S.CL at 2217 (recognizing competitive balance as a
legitimate interest).
73. Id. ("What role it properly plays in applying the Rule of Reason to the
allegations in this case is a matter to be considered on remand.").
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available at all,' per se rules of illegality are inapplicable, and
instead the restraint must be judged according to the flexible
Rule of Reason."74 The Court further noted that the restraint
will usually survive such an analysis.75 Furthermore, the Court
expressed the view that full rule of reason analysis might not be
necessary in all instances, and that an abridged version could be
applied in similar cases.6
C. Competition Law in the European Union
1. The Treaty on the Functioning of Europe, Article 101
Similar to the United States, the European Union also
prohibits anti-competitive restraints.77 Article 101 (1) of the
Treaty on the Functioning of European Union ("TFEU")
prohibits agreements that affect trade by restricting
competition. Only when a restraint prevents, restricts, or
distorts competition to an appreciable extent does it violate
Article 101(1).79 The main inquiries are (1) whether there is an
agreement between undertakings, (2) whether the object or
effect of the restraint is the prevention, restriction or distortion
of competition, and (3) whether it affects trade between
member states.s0 An undertaking includes "every entity engaged
74. See id. at 2216 (quoting NCAA v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S.
85, 101 (1984)).
75. See id. ("In such instances, the agreement is likely to survive the Rule of
Reason.").
76. See id. at 2216-17 ("[Dlepending upon the concerted activity in question, the
Rule of Reason may not require a detailed analysis; it 'can sometimes be applied in the
twinkling of an eye.'") (quoting NCAA, 468 U.S. at 109, n. 39).
77. See Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union art. 101, 2008 O.J. C 115/47, at 88 [hereinafter TFEU]; see also Howard W. Fogt,
Jr. & Ilene Knable Gotts, The Antitrust and Technology Transfer Licensing Interface: A
Comparative Interface of Current Developments, 13 INT'L TAX & Bus. J. 1, 29 (1995-96)
(noting the European Union's commitment to removing anti-competitive restraints).
78. See TFEU, supra note 77, 2008 O.J. C 115/47, at 88 (prohibiting agreements
that restrict or distort trade between members of the European Union); see also Sean-
Paul Brankin, Introduction, in INTRODUCTION TO EU COMPETITION LAW 1, 12 (Peter R
Willis ed., 2005) (explaining that Article 101 prohibits anti-competitive restraints).
79. See TFEU, supra note 77, art. 101, 2008 O.J. C 115/47, at 88-89 (listing the
requirements for a violation of competition law); see also Brankin, supra note 78, at 12
("For an agreement to infringe the Article [101(1)] prohibition it must [ prevent,
restrict or distort competition; and [ ] do so to an appreciable extent.").
80. Ariel Ezrachi, EU COMPETITION LAW: AN ANALYTICAL GUIDE TO THE LEADING
CASES 44-45 (2d ed. 2010) (dividing Article 101 into four main questions); accord Marc
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in an economic activity, regardless of the legal status of the
entity and the way in which it is financed . . . ."81
Analysis of the object or effect of a restraint is disjunctive.82
If either the object or the effect of a restraint is the prevention,
restriction, or distortion of competition, it is prohibited.83
Finally, when determining the effect on trade between member
states, courts look to reasonably foreseeable objective factors
that may have "an influence, direct or indirect, actual or
potential, on the pattern of trade between Member States
capable of preventing the realization of a single market between
the said States."84 The intent of such an analysis is to draw a
boundary between areas covered by national law and areas
covered by European Union law.85
TFEU Article 101(3) offers possible exemptions from
competition law.86 Article 101(3) grants exemptions from 101 (1)
in a few specific instances.87 For example, a restraint may be
exempt if it improves distributional, technical, or economic
progress, and allows consumers a fair share of the resulting
benefit.88 These exemptions, however, only apply if the restraint
exclusively affects areas that are indispensable to attaining the
Firestone, A Quick Look at Two Areas of Doctrinal Difference Between EU and U.S. Decision
Makers, 20 TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 1, 22 (2011) (describing the four elements of a
violation under Article 101).
81. H6fner v. Macrotron GmbH, Case C-41/90, [1991] E.C.R. 1-1979, 1 21
(defining the term "undertaking").
82. See TFEU, supra note 77, art. 101(1), 2008 O.J. C 115/47, at 88 (prohibiting
agreements, decisions, and concerted practices "which may affect trade between
Member States and which have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or
distortion of competition . . . .") (emphasis added).
83. See SociCtd Technique Minitre v. Maschinenbau Ulm GmbH, Case 56/65,
[1966] E.C.R. 235, 249 (noting that the requirements are alternative rather than
cumulative).
84. See id. at 251; see also Lindholm, supra note 9, at 199 (quoting Socidid Technique
Minidre, [1966] E.C.R. 235 at 249).
85. See Consten S.A.R.L. & Grundig-Verkaufs-GmbH v. Commission, joined Cases
56/64 & 58/64, [1966] E.C.R. 299, 341 (differentiating between national laws and
those that apply to interactions between Member States).
86. See TFEU, supra note 77, art. 101(3), 2008 O.J. C 115/47, at 88-89 (offering
exemptions from the prohibited activities under Article 101(1)); see also Ezrachi, supra
note 80, at 49 (describing various exemptions from competition law).
87. See TFEU, supra note 77, art. 101(3), 2008 O.J. C 115/47, at 88-89 (exempting
certain agreements, decisions, and practices that would otherwise be prohibited by
Article 101(1)).
88. See id. (specifying requirements for exemption from Article 101(1) coverage).
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stated goal and does not give the undertakings the opportunity
to eliminate competition.89 Under Article 101(3) analysis, the
court will weigh advantages and disadvantages.90
Similarly, restrictions that are necessary for the
implementation of a non-restrictive activity, and are also
proportionate to the activity are exempted from competition law
under the ancillary restraints exemption.9' To be directly
related, the restraint must be "subordinate to the
implementation of that transaction and [ ] inseparably linked to
it."92 To determine the necessity of a restriction, a court must
decide whether it is objectively necessary to implement the main
transaction.93 Unlike the Article 101(3) defense, the ancillary
restraint defense does not permit judicial weighing of pro-
competitive versus anti-competitive effects. 94
The European Court of Justice ("ECJ") has established its
own version of a non-statutory labor exemption similar to the
one used in the United States. In the 2007 case International
Transportation Workers Federation v. Viking Line ABP, Advocate
General Poiares Maduro opined that collective agreements were
immune from antitrust laws.9 5 This opinion became particularly
relevant to professional sports when, in 2007, UEFA and the
Fdd6ration Internationale des Associations Professionnels
("FIFPro") Division Europe signed a Memorandum of
Understanding, in which UEFA recognized FIFPro Division
89. See id. (noting further requirements for exemption from Article 101 (1)).
90. See GlaxoSmithKline Servs. v. Comm'n, Case T-168/01, [2006] E.C.R. 11-2969,
244 (granting the European Commission ("EC") discretion to weigh the advantages
and disadvantages of a particular restraint).
91. Commission Communication on the Guidelines on the Application of Article
81(3) of the Treaty, 2004 O.J. C 101/08 at 97, 1 29 [hereinafter TFEU Guidelines]
(explaining the requirements of exemption under the ancillary restraints doctrine);
Ezrachi, supra note 80, at 47 (exempting restrictions that are "directly related to and
necessary for the implementation of a main non-restrictive transaction and [are]
proportionate to it").
92. TFEU Guidelines, supra note 91, at 97, 101.
93. Id. (requiring the court to discern whether a restriction is necessary).
94. Id. (instructing the court against weighing pro-competitive effects against anti-
competitive effects).
95. Opinion of Advocate General Maduro, Int'l Transp. Workers' Fed'n v. Viking
Line ABP, Case C-438/05, [2007] E.C.R. 1-10779, 27 (citing Opinion of Advocate
General Jacobs, Albany Int'l BV v. Stichting Bedrijfspensioenfonds Textielindustrie,
Case C-67/96, [1999] E.C.R. 1-5751, 179, 183) ("[Clollective agreements must enjoy
a 'limited antitrust immunity.'").
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Europe as "the only umbrella organisation of trade unions for
professional association football players in Europe."96 In the
same agreement, FIFPro Division Europe recognized UEFA "as
the European governing body for association football at all
levels."97 Through this formal mutual recognition, UEFA and
FIFPro Division Europe closely resemble a typical US-style
players' association, which would be granted limited antitrust
immunity under Viking Line and its 1999 predecessor, Albany
International BVv. Stichting Bedriffspensioenfonds Textielindustrie.98
2. Application of Competition Law to Sports
As long as sports constitute economic activity, they are
subject to competition law.99 In 1993, the ECJ specifically
declared that the activities of professional and semi-professional
footballers comprised economic activity, thus subjecting them to
competition law.oo The ECJ proceeded to hold that even in
cases where the restraint directly governed the sport, "the mere
fact that a rule [was] purely sporting in nature [did] not have
the effect of removing [it] from the scope of the [TFEU]."1or
The ECJ's standard of review differs slightly from the US
standard. Unlike the United States, where the rule of reason
applies, and courts engage in a balancing test between pro- and
anti-competitive effects, the ECJ claims that it does not employ a
96. Players' Unions, UEFA.COM, http://www.uef-a.com/uefa/stakeholders/
playersunions/index.html (last visited Sept. 23, 2012) [hereinafter Players' Unions].
97. Id.
98. See Opinion of Advocate General Maduro, Int'l Transp. Workers' Fed'n, [2007]
E.C.R. 1-10779, 1 27 (citing Opinion of Advocate GeneralJacobs, Albany Int'l BV, [1999]
E.C.R. 1-5751) (granting limited antitrust immunity to collective agreements); see also
Players' Unions, supra note 96 (acknowledging that the Federation Internationale des
Footballeurs Professionnels ("FIFPro") represents soccer players).
99. Union Royale Beige des Socidt6s de Football Ass'n ASBL v. Bosman, Case
415/93, [1995] E.C.R. 1-4921, 1 73 (holding that sports are only subject to Community
law if they constitute economic activity); B.N.O. Walrave v. Association Union Cycliste
Internationale, Case 36/74, [1974] E.C.R. 1405, 1417 (noting that sports are subject to
Community law when they embody economic activity).
100. Bosman, [1995] E.C.R. 1-4921, 1 73 ("This applies to the activities of
professional or semi-professional footballers . . . .").
101. Meca-Medina v. Comm'n of the European Communities, Case C-519/04,
[2006] E.C.R. 1-6991, 1 27; Commission of the European Communities, The EU and
Sport: White Paper from the Commission to the European Council, COM (2007) 391
Final, 2.1.1, (July 11, 2007) [hereinafter Wite Paper].
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rule of reason when analyzing a restraint under Article 101 (1).102
Any balancing of competitive effects, the ECJ ruled, should be
limited to analysis under Article 101 (3).1os
In practice, however, the analysis is not always carried out
this way. In 2006, the ECJ took a significant step toward the US
model. In Meca-Medina v. Commission of the European Communities,
a case involving an anti-doping rule for Olympic swimmers, the
ECJ engaged in balancing pro- and anti-competitive effects of
the rule.'04 The rule in question, promulgated by the
International Olympic Committee ("IOC"), prohibited the use
of certain drugs. 0 - A male athlete would be in violation of this
policy if certain substances were found in his body in excess of a
pre-established limit.10 6 The athletes in this case, having been
suspended from competition under the policy, argued that the
two-nanogram limit was scientifically unfounded, and a
suspension as a result would "lead[] to the infringement of the
athletes' economic freedoms." 07 Ultimately the ECJ held that
because the rule was necessary for the "proper conduct of
competitive sport," the rule was justifiable, and thus exempt
from competition law. 08
In its Meca-Medina opinion, the ECJ borrowed logic from
Wouters v. Algemene Raad van de Nederlandse Orde van Advocaten, a
2002 case in which the Court held that the overall context, as
well as the objects and effects of the restraint in question, must
be taken into account. " The Wouters Court also held that the
102. See M6tropole TC16vision v. Comm'n of the European Cmtys., Case T-112/99,
[2001] E.C.R. 11-2459, 1[ 74 (identifying the only situation in which any sort of pro- or
anti-competitive balancing may take place); 02 GmbH v. Commission, Case T-328/03,
[2006] E.C.R. 11-1231, 1 69 (noting that no assessment of pro- or anti-competitive
effects should take place); Kaso-Howard, supra note 32, at 1170 (describing the
American version of rule of reason analysis).
103. See 02 GmbH, [2006] E.C.R. 11-1231, 69 (holding that rule of reason has no
place under Article 101(1)); see also Ezrachi, supra note 80, at 47 (arguing that Article
101(1) does not entail any 'rule of reason' analysis).
104. See Meca-Medina, [2006] E.C.R. 1-6991, 29-30.
105. Id. 2 (acknowledging the IOC's anti-doping rule).
106. Id. 2 (explaining some of the details of the anti-doping rule).
107. Id. 3.
108. Id. 19-21 (exempting the anti-doping rule from competition law).
109. Id. 42 (citing to Wouters for the proposition that "account must ... be
taken of the overall context. . . and ... its objectives"); Wouters v. Algemene Raad van
de Nederlandse Orde van Advocaten, Case C-309/99, [2002] E.C.R. 1-1577, 97
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ECJ must determine whether the restrictive effects were
inherent to the objectives, and if those effects were
proportionate to the objectives. 0
Under the Meca-Medina and Wouters analysis, a legitimate
objective may justify an otherwise restrictive activity."' Examples
of legitimate objectives include ensuring fair competition,
protecting the health of the athletes, keeping spectators safe,
ensuring financial stability of the sport, and maintaining
consistent rules for the sport."2 Also, akin to the United States,
maintaining competitive balance between teams in a
professional sports league, as well as maintaining uncertainty in
outcomes of matches, are considered legitimate aims.' '3
D. The History of Salary Caps in the United States
The NBA was the first of the four major US sports leagues
to institute a salary cap." 4 Shortly before and during the 1982-
83 NBA season, then-Commissioner Lawrence O'Brien, National
Basketball Players Association ("NBPA") counsel Lawrence
Fleisher, and future-Commissioner David Stern, met to
negotiate a player salary cap. 15 After difficult talks, the parties
(holding that a court may assess the objects and effects of a restriction in determining
whether it violates competition law).
110. Wouters, [2002] E.C.R. 1-1577, 110 (holding that the court must decide
whether the anti-competitive effects were inherent and proportionate to its pro-
competitive objective).
111. See id.; Meca-Medina, [2006] E.C.R. 1-6991, 1 45 (holding that the anti-doping
rule was not a violation of competition law because it was justified by legitimate
objectives).
112. Bosman, [1995] E.C.R. 1-4921, 1 106 (including preserving uncertainty of
results and recruiting young players as examples of a legitimate objectives); White Paper,
supra note 101, at 1 2.1.5 (listing some examples of legitimate objectives for restrictions
in sports).
113. Bosman, [1995] E.C.R. 1-4921, 1 106 (holding that maintaining competitive
balance is a legitimate objective); see Lehtonen v. F6ddration Royale Belge des Socidtds
de Basket-Ball ASBL, Case C-176/96,[2000] E.C.R. 1-2681, 1 53-55 (recognizing the
importance of competitive balance throughout a season).
114. See Staudohar, supra note 7, at 4 (detailing the history of the 1982 NBA
Collective Bargaining Agreement ("CBA"), which established the first salary cap in
professional sports); see also Ryan T. Dryer, Beyond the Box Score: A Look at Collective
Bargaining Agreements in Professional Sports and Their Effect on Competition, 2008 J. DISP.
RESOL. 267, 276 (2008) (noting that the NBA was the first American professional sports
league to have a salary cap).
115. See Staudohar, supra note 7, at 4 (describing the negotiations between the
NBA and the NBPA); see also ROBERT C. BERRY ET AL., LABOR RELATIONS IN
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reached an agreement on March 31, 1983 that limited teams to
US$3.6 million in salaries, or fifty-three percent of gross
revenues, whichever was higher. 116
In 1998, the NBPA demanded the removal of salary caps.' 17
This time, the owners locked out the players and threatened to
cancel the season." 8 Ultimately, the season was salvaged when
both sides agreed to keep salary caps in place." 9 In 2005, both
sides agreed to make slight changes to the salary cap structure,
leading to an amicable agreement on the new collective
bargaining agreement ("CBA").12 0
Once again in 2011, the NBA and NBPA clashed over the
CBA. Unable to reach an agreement, the NBA owners locked
the players out on July 1.121 After five months of hard-fought
labor disputes, the sides finally agreed upon a new ten-year CBA
on December 8, 2011.122 Under the new agreement, the
PROFESSIONAL SPORTS 181 (1986) (discussing the background of the 1982 NBA labor
negotiations).
116. See Staudohar, supra note 7, at 4 (reporting that the reason the actual
amount was higher than the one scheduled was that the actual amount reflected fifty-
three percent of revenues, while the scheduled amount was merely the minimum cap);
Andrew Zimbalist, Perspective; Team Profits and Labor Peace, N.Y. TIMES, July 5, 1998, at
Sec. 8, p. 13 (describing the terms of the CBA).
117. Larry Coon, NBA Salaty Cap FAQ (Aug. 5, 2012), http://www.cbafaq.com/
salarycap.htm [hereinafter NBA Salary CAPFAQ; Zimbalist, supra note 116, at § 8, p. 13
(observing the players' refusal to accept a salary cap).
118. NBA Salary Cap FAQ, supra note 117 (noting the lockout imposed by the NBA
owners in 1998); see Zimbalist, supra note 116 (acknowledging the lockout in 1998).
119. NBA Salary Cap FAQ, supra note 117 (noting that the 1998 agreement created
a salary cap); accord Laura Vecsey, M's in Thick of Baseball's Financial Mess, SEATTLE
POST-INTELLIGENCER, May 18, 1999, at El (mentioning that the NBA lockout was
ended with a salary cap).
120. NBA Salary Cap FAQ, supra note 117 (mentioning that the new NBA CBA was
signed in July of 2005); NBA's Collective Bargaining Agreement Finalized and Signed, USA
TODAY, July 30, 2005, available at http://www.usatoday.com/sports/basketball/nba/
2005-07-30-cba-finalizedx.htm (reporting the completion of the NBA's new CBA).
121. See Howard Beck, Stalemate in Labor Talks Forces N.B.A. to Shut Down, N.Y.
TIMES, July 1, 2011, at B9 ("After two years of static negotiations on a new labor deal,
N.B.A. owners voted Thursday to impose a lockout... ."); see also NBA Lockout Timeline,
NBA.coM (Sept. 9, 2011), http://www.nba.com/2011/news/09/09/labor-timeline/
index.html (noting the date of the 2011 NBA lockout) [hereinafter NBA Lockout
Timeline].
122. See NBA Lockout Timeline, supra note 121 (noting the date of the ratification
of the new CBA); see generally Nathaniel Grow, Decertifying Players' Unions: Lessons From
the NFL and NBA Lockouts of 2011 (Univ. of Ga., Dep't of Ins., Legal Studies, Real Estate
Working Paper Series) (describing the 2011 NBA lockout).
184 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL IAWJOURNAL [Vol. 36:163
minimum percentage of the cap that teams must spend on
players' salaries increased from the previous CBA.12 3
Salary caps were first incorporated by the NFL in the 1993
CBA between the league and the National Football League
Players Association ("NFLPA").124 The CBA, which took effect in
1994, guaranteed players a minimum salary of fifty-eight percent
and a maximum of sixty-four percent of gross revenues. 25 Over
the next few years, the maximum percentage varied slightly,
ultimately ending up at sixty-two percent in 1997.126 The 1993
CBA was extended to remain in effect through 2007, with the
final year being uncapped as an incentive to finish the extension
before the CBA expired.'27 In 2006, the final uncapped year of
the CBA, CBA extension negotiations stalled over a revenue
sharing issue.'28 On March 8, 2006, the NFL and NFLPA agreed
to terms and extended the CBA for six more years.''
123. NBA Salary Cap FAQ supra note 117 (charting the increase in minimum
payroll from year to year); Ira Winderman, NBA CBA: Official NBA Agreement Document,
SUN SENTINEL (Nov. 27, 2011, 9:49 AM), http://blogs.sun-sentinel.com/
sports..basketball-heat/201 1/11 /nba-cba-official-nba-agreement-document.html
(giving details of the 2011 NBA CBA agreement).
124. See Staudohar, supra note 7, at 6 (documenting when the NFL first instituted
a salary cap); see also Larry Weisman, Tagliabue Likes to See Big Picture, USA TODAY, Nov.
29, 1993, at IC (noting that the new labor agreement included a salary cap).
125. See Staudohar, supra note 7, at 7 (laying out percentages NFL teams must pay
their players); see also Rick Stroud, Tampa Bay Buccaneers \ What's the Game Plan?, ST.
PETERSBURG TIMES, Nov. 28, 1993, at 1A (noting the amount of gross revenues NFL
teams must spend on players under the new CRA).
126. See Staudohar, supra note 7, at 7 (tracking salary cap percentages from 1994
to 1997); see also Hal Bock, Salary Cap Born in '82 With NBA, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER,
Aug. 21, 1994, at 4H (mentioning the changes in gross revenue percentages to be paid
over the years).
127. See Ari Nissim, The Trading Game: NFL Free Agency, the Salary Cap, and a
Proposal for Greater Trading Flexibility, 11 SPORTS LAW J. 257, 258, 262 (2004) (noting
that the CBA had been extended through 2007, with 2006 as the final capped year); see
also Tagliabue Timeline, USA TODAY, Mar. 21, 2006, at 3C (including January 7, 2002
extension of NFL CBA through 2007 in timeline of NFL Commissioner Tagliabue's
career, as well as his avoidance of an uncapped year in 2007).
128. See David C. Weiss, How Terrell Owens, Collective Bargaining, and Forfeiture
Restrictions Created a Moral Hazard That Caused the NFL Crime Wave and What it Meant for
Michael Vick, 15 SPORTS LAw.J. 279, 298 (2008) (opining on the reason for the failure
of CBA negotiations); see also Ed Bouchette, Signing Ward No. I Priority, PITr. POST-
GAZETTE, Mar. 22, 2005, at D6 (predicting that solving the revenue sharing problem
will be necessary to approve a new CBA).
129. SeeJarrett Bell, NFL Owners Preserve Labor Peace, USA TODAY, Mar. 9, 2006, at
IC (reporting that players and owners agreed to extend the CBA); see also Mark Maske,
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In spite of the recent agreement, the NFL opted out of the
2006 CBA in 2008.130 Despite NFL Commissioner Roger Goodell
and NFLPA Executive Director Gene Upshaw's initial optimism,
the two sides were unable to reach an agreement by the March
11, 2011 deadline.' 3' Ultimately, the NFLPA decertified, or
ceased representing the players, and the players brought an
antitrust suit against the League.132 Both sides ratified a new ten-
year CBA on August 4, 2011, settling the antitrust suit.1 3s Part of
the new CBA required teams to spend at least eighty-nine
percent of the salary cap annually.'14 This requirement, however,
will not take effect until 2013.'13
Eagles'Deactivation of Owens Stands, WASHINGTON POST, Mar. 9, 2006 (observing that the
2006 CBA had been extended for six more years).
130. John Clayton, NFL Owners Vote Unanimously to Opt out of Labor Deal,
ESPN.coM (May 20, 2008), http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/news/story?id=3404596
(reporting that NFL owners had opted out of the 2006 CBA); Jarrett Bell, Contentious
Campaign, Critical Vote Much Is on the Line as NFLPA Gets Ready to Select Its Nero Leader,
USA TODAY, Mar. 11, 2009, at IC (noting that NFL owners voted to opt out of the CBA
in early May).
131. See Clayton, supra note 130 ("'We are not in dire straits. We've never said
that. But the agreement isn't working, and we're looking to get a more fair and
equitable deal' [said Goodell]", with Upshaw adding "'All this means is that we will
have football now until 2010 and not until 2012,'"); see also Alex Marvez, NFL Owners
Lock Out Players, Fox SPORTS (Mar. 12, 2011), http://msn.foxsports.com/nfl/story/
NFL-Players-Association-union-decertifies-labor-talks-owners-0311 11 (detailing the
inability of the NFL and the National Football League Players' Association ("NFLPA")
to agree to terms).
132. See Brady v. Nat'l Football League, 779 F. Supp. 2d 992 (stating the factual
background of a suit in which NFL players sued the league for an antitrust violation);
See Marvez, supra note 131 ("Shortly after Friday's decertification, an antitrust lawsuit
was filed against the NFL by nine current NFL players . . . .")
133. NFL Players Ratify New CBA, ESPN.cOM (Aug. 5, 2011), http://espn.go.com/
nfl/story/_/id/6834391/nfl-players-ratif-collective-bargaining-agreement-which-
includes-hgh-testing-sources-say (reporting the players' ratification of a new CBA); NFL
Players Ratify Agreement-CBA Details Worked Out; League Plans HGH Tests, MEMPHIS
CoM. APPEAL, Aug. 5, 2011, at D2 (detailing some aspects of the CBA ratified by NFL
players).
134. See Mike Florio, Per-Team Spending Minimum Doesn't Apply Until 2013, NBC
SPORTS (July 30, 2011), http://profootballtalk.nbcsports.com/2011/07/30/per-team-
spending-minimum-doesnt-apply-until-2013 (reporting the minimum percentage of the
salary cap teams must spend annually); see also Could Rams, Jaguars Pull Off Double
Move?, ST. LouIS Bus.JOURNAL, Dec. 1, 2011 [hereinafter Double Move] (acknowledging
the minimum spending requirements of NFL teams starting in 2013).
135. Florio, supra note 134 (noting that this provision will not take place until
2013); Double Move, supra note 134 (noting that the minimums take effect in 2013).
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E. Salary Caps in the European Union
Salary caps in the European Union are extremely rare, and
thus far have only been implemented in a handful of sports
leagues (typically rugby leagues).136 As Europe's premier
professional sports association, UEFA's recent attempt to
implement a salary cap scheme will draw a great deal of
scholarly attention in the coming years. 37 On May 27, 2010,
UEFA's Executive Committee unanimously approved the
Financial Fair Play Regulations ("FFP"), a set of new regulations
intended to protect the financial viability of its member clubs.'38
Noting that clubs were sustaining high losses due to, at least in
part, high player salaries, UEFA felt that there was an urgent
need to "curb[] the excessive spending and inflated transfer fees
and player salaries that have endangered football in recent
years."139 To achieve this goal, the FFP has a "break-even
requirement," which says that a club will fail if its expenses
exceed its income by more than EUC5 million over a three year
period.140
II. GETTING THE BALL IN PLAY: ARE SALARY CAPS
PERMISSIBLE UNDER THE RELEVANT
COMPETITION/ANTITRUST LAWS?
Part II explores in greater depth the question of whether
salary caps are legal in the United States and the European
136. See Lindholm, supra note 9, at 190 (describing early attempts at salary caps in
European rugby leagues); see also Clarke, supra note 10, at 630 ("[T]here are currently
no regulations mandating salary caps in Europe.").
137. See Lindholm, supra note 9, at 190 (comparing the amount of attention
rugby league salary caps have drawn compared to the amount soccer leagues will likely
receive); see also Clarke, supra note 10, at 630 (debating the possibility of a salary cap
structure in European sports).
138. See Clarke, supra note 10, at 622-23 (discussing the Financial Fair Play rules);
see also FFP Regulations Approved (announcing the approval of the Financial Fair Play
Rules).
139. FFP Explained, supra note 11 ("The aggregate loss of Europe's top clubs was
C578 million, with some 65% of income [being] spent on average on salaries, and 47%
of clubs report[ing] losses."); see Paul Kelso, Debt Ball. UEFA To Give Clubs Red Cards,
SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, Jan. 23, 2010, at 6 (explaining Financial Fair Play rules as a
way to prevent teams from unsustainable short term spending).
140. See Lindholm, supra note 9, at 194 (comparing the Financial Fair Play salary
cap to other salary cap structures); see also Kelso, supra note 139 (explaining the
nuances of the spending limits of Financial Fair Play).
2013] SALARY CAPS AND EUROPEAN SPORTS 187
Union. Part II.A examines the issues that the United States has
faced regarding salary caps and antitrust law. Then, Part II.B
explains the recent trends in European competition law and
analogizes those cases to potential salary cap issues.
A. Antitrust Litigation over Salary Caps in the United States
As long as salary caps have been used in US professional
sports, they have been challenged as violations of the Sherman
Act.14 1 The most common defense offered for salary caps has
been the non-statutory labor exemption. 142 There is little debate
over whether the non-statutory labor exemption from antitrust
law applies to salary caps where a labor union represents the
players.'43 However, in situations where a players' association
does not bargain over a restraint (or does not represent the
players at all), there have been disagreements over whether the
restraint is still subject to the non-statutory labor exemption.1"
In 1987, a group of NBA players, through the NBPA, filed a
suit challenging the pending CBA that would replace the
expired 1980 agreement.145 While bargaining for the new CBA,
the NBA proposed a salary cap for the first time.146 After some
debate, the NBPA and the NBA ultimately agreed to add a salary
141. See, e.g., Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231 (1996) (addressing the
issue of salary caps in the NFL under antitrust law); Bridgeman v. NBA, 675 F. Supp.
960, 965 (D.N.J. 1987) (granting antitrust immunity to NBA when players sued for
antitrust violation over salary cap).
142. See, e.g., Brown, 518 U.S. at 243-44 (discussing non-statutory labor
exemptions in sports antitrust cases); Connell Constr. Co., Inc. v. Plumbers &
Steamfitters Local Union No. 100, 421 U.S. 616, 622 (1975) (discussing non-statutory
labor exemption in non-sports antitrust case).
143. See e.g., Brown, 518 U.S. at 250 (holding that when a labor union represents
employees, the non-statutory labor exemption will be applied); Wood v. NBA, 809 F.2d
954, 956-57 (2d Cir. 1987) (holding that the non-statutory labor exemption applied to
sports antitrust case).
144. See Clarett v. NFL, 369 F.3d 124, 142-43 (2d Cir. 2004) (holding that the
non-statutory exemption applied, despite the league and the union not negotiating
over the restraint in question). But see McCourt v. Cal. Sports, Inc., 600 F.2d 1193,
1197-98 (6th Cir. 1979) (holding that the non-statutory labor exemption did not apply
where a union failed to bargain over the restraint in question).
145. Bridgeman, 675 F. Supp. at 962 (describing the factual background
underlying the antitrust claim).
146. Id. (acknowledging that this was the first time that the NBA had tried to
introduce a salary cap).
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cap provision to the expired CBA, and to extend the CBA
through the 1986-87 season. 47
In February 1987, shortly before the season ended and the
CBA was set to expire, both sides resumed negotiations. 48 This
time, however, the NBPA and the NBA were unable to reach an
agreement, and the CBA expired.149 Pointing out that there was
no longer a CBA in effect, the players argued that the non-
statutory labor exemption should no longer apply, and brought
an antitrust suit against the NBA in Bridgeman v. NBA. 51o The
District of New Jersey disagreed, citing the non-statutory labor
exemption's purpose, which was to "balance the concerns of the
federal antitrust and labor laws," noting that "[t]he availability
of the exemption turns upon whether the federal labor interest
in collective bargaining is deserving of pre-eminence over the
federal antitrust interest in free competition under the
circumstances of the particular case."' 5 ' District of New Jersey
Judge Dickinson Debevoise used this reasoning to hold that
there was "no merit in the players' contention that restrictions
included in a collective bargaining agreement should lose their
antitrust immunity the moment the agreement expires."' 5 2
Bidgeman was not the only case where players challenged
an NBA rule through antitrust litigation.15 3 In 1984, the
Philadelphia 76ers drafted Leon Wood, offering him a one-year,
US$75,000 contract.15 4 However, the 76ers had already exceeded
their cap, and so the team informed Wood that it intended to
147. Id. at 962-63 (describing the agreement between the league and the players
to a salary cap); see Larry Whiteside, Inside Choice Stern Takes Over NBA Center Stage,
BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 17, 1983 (reporting that the year began for the NBA with the
passage of a new CBA, which included a salary cap).
148. Bridgeman, 675 F. Supp. at 963 (noting that CBA negotiations resumed in
February of 1987); see Phil Jasner, Sixers Fear the Worst on Ruland's Condition, PHILA.
DAILY NEWS, Feb. 12, 1987 (mentioning the beginning of NBA CBA negotiations).
149. See Bridgeman, 675 F. Supp. at 963 (recounting that upon a failure to reach
an agreement between the league and the players, the CBA expired); NBA Players Take
Case to Court, File a Class-Action Suit, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 2, 1987, at 10 (identifying the
expiration date of the CBA).
150. Bridgeman, 675 F. Supp. at 964 (arguing that in the absence of a CBA in
effect, the league's non-statutory labor exemption should no longer apply).
151. Id. at 965.
152. Id.
153. See Wood v. NBA, 809 F.2d 954, 956-57 (2d Cir. 1987) (characterizing the
plaintiff's claim as one for an antitrust violation).
154. See id. at 958 (noting the details of Wood's initial contract).
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restructure its roster to enable it to make a longer-term and
more lucrative offer to the point-guard. 55 In September of 1984,
Wood went to court, hoping to enjoin the agreement between
the League and the players' association, as well as to force the
76ers and other NBA teams to stop refusing to deal with him
except under the terms of the CBA.'56
The district court denied Wood's motion, finding that the
agreement, including the salary cap provisions, "affect[ed] only
the parties to the collective bargaining agreement . . . [and as
such, came] under the protective shield of our national labor
policy and [were] exempt from the reach of the Sherman
Act." 57 Wood appealed, claiming, inter alia, that the salary cap
was a per se violation of the Sherman Act.'58 The Second Circuit
held that his claim was clearly foreclosed by the non-statutory
labor exemption, and that there was no occasion to address
whether the salary cap was a per se violation or should be subject
to rule of reason analysis.'59 Thus, the salary cap scheme was left
in place for the 1988 CBA.16o
When the 1988 CBA expired on June 23, 1994, the NBA
brought an action against the players, arguing that the salary cap
did not violate antitrust law.'6 ' The League argued that in Wood
v. National Basketball Association, the Second Circuit had
definitively held that the non-statutory labor exemption applied
to salary caps, and as such, antitrust laws had no application.162
155. Id. (detailing the behind-the-scenes negotiations between Wood and the
76ers).
156. Id. (describing Wood's initial antitrust lawsuit against the league).
157. Id. (quoting Wood v. NBA, 602 F. Supp. 525, 528 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
158. Id.
159. Id. at 959 (finding that Wood's arguments were a "wholesale subversion of
[antitrust] policy, and ... must be rejected out of hand. As a result, whether the draft
and salary cap are per se violations of the antitrust laws or subject to rule of reason
analysis need not be decided.").
160. See Staudohar, supra note 7, at 5 (noting that the salary cap continued after
negotiations in 1988); see also Shaun Powell, Released Player: Heat Racist, MIAMI HERALD,
Aug. 2, 1988, at ID (mentioning that the salary cap would increase for the 1988-89
season).
161. NBA v. Williams, 857 F. Supp. 1069, 1072 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (describing the
NBA's arguments against the antitrust lawsuit); see Dan Wasserman, Supreme Court
Ruling Is Slam Dunk for Owners, STAR-LEDGER, June 21, 1996 (alluding to the Williams
case).
162. See Williams, 857 F. Supp. at 1073-74 (describing the league's arguments in
favor of the non-statutory labor exemption).
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The players countered that, unlike in Wood, the CBA in their
case had officially expired, and therefore the non-statutory labor
exemption should not apply.'16 - Citing Powell v. NFLJudge Kevin
Duffy of the Southern District of New York held that the
League's antitrust immunity continued beyond the expiration of
the CBA, as long as a collective bargaining relationship
existed. 6 4
His analysis, however, did not stop there. In dicta, Judge
Duffy opined that "even if the nonstatutory exemption did not
apply, the Players' charge of a per se violation of Section 1 of the
Sherman Act . . . is insufficient to carry the day."I 65 He noted
that professional sports leagues are joint ventures, and as such,
should be analyzed under a rule of reason standard.166 He then
proceeded to comment that "[e]ven under a rule of reason
analysis . . . the Players have failed to show that the alleged
restraints of trade are on balance unreasonably anti-
competitive." 67 The Second Circuit affirmed Judge Duffy's
holding that the non-statutory exemption applied, even though
the CBA had expired, but declined to address the arguments he
made in dicta.168 Having survived another antitrust lawsuit, the
salary cap scheme stayed in place largely as it was. 169
163. Id. at 1074.
164. Id. at 1078 (citing Powell v. NFL, 930 F.2d 1293, 1303-04 (8th Cir. 1989))
("Antitrust immunity exists as long as a collective bargaining relationship exists.")
(emphasis added). In using this logic, Judge Duffy pointed out that the players were
not stuck forever with the provisions from the expired CBA. Id. He noted that the
players could apply economic pressure to bargain for different provisions and always
had the option of decertifying the union and bringing an antitrust claim then. Id.
165. Id. at 1078.
166. See id.
167. Id. at 1079.
168. See Nat'l Basketball Ass'n v. Williams, 45 F.3d 584, 688 (2d Cir. 2004)
("Because the Players' position appears to be inconsistent with the approach taken
under the antitrust laws regardless of labor law and, in any event, collides head-on with
the labor laws' endorsement of multiemployer collective bargaining, we conclude that
the Players' claim must fail. We need not, therefore, address the various arguments pro
and con regarding the Rule of Reason.").
169. See generally Williams, 857 F. Supp. at 1079; No Violation, DOMINION POST,Jan.
26, 1995, at 19 (reporting the court's denial that the NBA violated antitrust laws by
continuing the salary cap after the CBA expired in 1994).
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In 1996, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the Bridgeman
holding in the context of professional football.o70 In 1987, the
CBA between the NFL and the NFLPA expired.'7 ' During
negotiations, the NFL created a system that would allow teams to
maintain developmental squads and proposed a US$1,000 per-
week, per-player salary. 72 After failing to agree to terms with the
NFLPA during collective bargaining, the NFL unilaterally
imposed the system.'73
The development squad players responded by filing a
lawsuit against the NFL, claiming that the imposed weekly salary
was a violation of the Sherman Act. 74 In a ruling that closely
resembled the district court's holding in Bridgeman, the
Supreme Court held that the NFL was shielded from antitrust
litigation by the non-statutory labor exemption even though
there was no CBA in effect. 75
B. Salary Caps in the EU
Contrary to the United States, salary caps in the European
Union have never been directly challenged in court.176
Nevertheless, there has been no shortage of debate over
whether salary caps will or should be permitted under existing
EU competition law.'" For its part, the European Commission,
which initiates EU legislation, has expressly declared that it is
undecided as to whether salary caps will violate competition
170. See Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231, 244-45 (1996) (holding that
the non-statutory labor exemption does not disappear once the parties reach a
bargaining impasse).
171. Id at 234.
172. Id. (summarizing factual background of the case).
173. Id. at 235 (noting that the NFL acted unilaterally in imposing the
developmental squad player fixed salary).
174. Id. at 234 (articulating the claims made by the players arguing that such a
structure was a violation of antitrust law).
175. Id. (applying the non-statutory exemption because the conduct "grew out of,
and was directly related to, the lawful operation of the bargaining process.").
176. See White Paper, supra note 101, 1 2.3 (listing pending and undecided issues
of competition in sports); see also Chris Davies, The Financial Crisis in the English Premier
League: Is a Salary Cap the Answer?, E.C.L.R. 2010, 31(11), 442, 444 (2010) (" [I]t should
be noted that salary caps have, so far, never actually been challenged in court.").
177. See, e.g., Davies, supra note 176, at 446-47 (debating the values of a salary cap
in the English Premier League); RICHARD PARRISH, SPORTS LAW AND POLICY IN THE
EUROPEAN UNION 156 (Simon Bulmer et al. eds., 2003) (balancing the positives and
negatives of a salary cap in European sports).
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law. 78 Commentators widely believe that a salary cap in the
European Union would be overturned if challenged in court.'79
These observers have opined that a salary cap scheme would be
considered overly restrictive, and would fail under TFEU Article
101.18
It is also true, however, that soccer is extremely important
to Europeans, and its preservation is of paramount
importance.' 8' Thus, the question becomes, how can the
European Commission best achieve its goal of "contribut[ing] to
the promotion of European sporting issues, while taking
account of the specific nature of sport" while also accounting for
the mandates under Article 101 of the TFEU?' 82 The answer lies
in the ECJ's ability to balance these competing interests as it
considers the enforceability of salary caps.
Salary caps have a long, well-litigated history in US sports.
US courts have generally found salary caps to be permissible in
professional sports leagues, largely thanks to the non-statutory
labor exemption. The European Union, conversely, is just now
beginning to broach the subject of salary caps. It is still unknown
how the ECJ will deal with salary caps when applying
competition law policies. What is known, however, is that
178. See White Paper, supra note 101, 2.3 (identifying "the idea of introducing
salary caps in professional football" as an "outstanding legal issue[ ]"); see EU
Commission Considers Salary and Transfer Fee Cap, FC BUSINESS (Feb. 23, 2011),
http://fcbusiness.co.uk/news/article/newsitem=986/title=eu+commission+considers+
salary+and+transfer+fee+cap (emphasis added) ("[Tihe European Commission will
look into the possibility of taking action, including capping fees."). The European
Commission is responsible for passing legislation for the EU, as well as ensuring that
EU law is applied throughout the member states. See generaUy EUROPEAN COMMISSION,
http://ec.europa.eu/legislation/index-en.htm (last visited Aug. 13, 2012).
179. See, e.g., Snyder, supra note 8, at 519 (opining that a salary cap would likely
be a violation of Article 101); see also Schiera, supra note 7, at 736 (arguing that the EC
would likely not accept an argument that a hard salary cap is necessary).
180. See, e.g., Paul Harris, What Position do Team Salary Caps Play in the Game of
Competitive Balance?, MONCKTON CHAMBERS (1999) (opining that salary caps are an
unreasonable restraint of trade); see also Schiera, supra note 7, at 735-36 (asserting that
a hard salary cap would likely be too restrictive under Article 101).
181. See Tony Karon, What Soccer Means to the World, TIME (July 21, 2004),
http://www.time.com/time/arts/article/0,8599,671302,00.html (musing on the
importance of soccer to the world, and in particular, Europe); see generally The Social
and Community Value of Football SUPPORTERS DiREcr (June, 2010),
http://www.supporters-direct.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/08/The-Social-Value-of-
Football-2010.pdf (documenting soccer's importance to Europe).
182. TFEU, supra note 77, art. 165, 2008 O.J. C 115/47, at 120.
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European soccer clubs are losing large sums of money due to
excessive team payrolls.8 3
III. LEADING BY EXAMPLE: UEFA AND THE ECJ SHOULD
FIND A WAY TO MAKE SALARY CAPS WORK IN THE
EUROPEAN UNION
Part III recommends that UEFA should follow the United
States' lead and implement its salary cap structure. Part III.A
argues that UEFA should utilize collective bargaining with a
union to achieve this goal. Part III.B argues that, even in the
absence of collective bargaining, the ECJ should find that
competitive balance justifies the salary cap. Finally, Part III
concludes that the fate of UEFA, both competitively and
economically, hangs in the balance, and that in order to save it,
salary caps must be exempted from competition law.
A. UEFA Should Try to Implement the Salary Cap Structure Through
Collective Bargaining
The best way for UEFA to ensure immunity from
competition law is by pushing the largely untested European
version of the non-statutory labor exemption. This is the most
effective method of implementing a restraint like a salary cap.
Reinforcing the European non-statutory labor exemption will
also serve to provide a measure of immunity from competition
law in the future.'84
Despite not formally acknowledging the existence of a
blanket non-statutory labor exemption in the sports competition
law arena, the ECJ has shown signs that it is amenable to such a
defense. 85 In the United States, the non-statutory labor
exemption has been extremely successful in providing immunity
183. See Clout, supra note 11 (detailing the financial losses incurred by European
soccer teams); see also Soccer Shorts, IRISH TIMES, May 24, 2012, at 16 (recounting the
financial losses endured by English Premier League clubs in 2010-11).
184. See supra note 98 and accompanying text (discussing the exemption sports
receive from competition law when collective bargaining takes place).
185. See supra note 98 and accompanying text (characterizing the European Court
of Justice ("ECJ") as being willing to grant limited antitrust exemptions in cases
involving collective bargaining).
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from antitrust liability in professional sports.'18 From salary caps
in the NBA to fixed salaries for developmental players in the
NFL, US courts have consistently found that the non-statutory
labor exemption immunizes leagues and unions from antitrust
liability.'87
Although there are several ways in which UEFA can attempt
to implement a legal salary cap, doing so via collective
bargaining is likely more effective than any of the other
methods. Should UEFA implement a salary cap through
collective bargaining, it can look to the successful, stable, US
model for guidance.'18 Given the ECJ's move toward accepting a
non-statutory labor exemption defense, in conjunction with the
long history of guidance from US courts, UEFA's chances of
achieving a salary cap scheme would be greatly enhanced by
following this method. 89
B. The EC Should Find that Competitive Balance Justifies Salary Caps
in UEFA
If UEFA is unable or unwilling to collectively bargain with
FIFPro Division Europe, there is still a possibility that a salary
cap structure could survive. If the ECJ does not grant immunity
in the form of a non-statutory labor exemption, it will be in a
position to adjudicate UEFA's salary cap structure on the merits
as a matter of first impression. o9 0 If this is the case, then the ECJ
should take a long look at the history of such litigation in the
United States.'9 '
The United States has had the luxury of not needing to
address the legality of salary caps under the Sherman Act
186. See supra notes 30-31 (listing a number of cases where the non-statutory
labor exemption was applied to sports antitrust cases).
187. See supra note 31 and accompanying text (giving examples of non-statutory
labor exemptions in sports).
188. See supra notes 26-31 (demonstrating the stability and uniformity of court
rulings under the non-statutory labor exemption).
189. See supra notes 29-31, 95-98 (summarizing US jurisprudence on non-
statutory labor exemption in professional sports, as well as the judicial shift in the
European Union towards limited antitrust immunity where there is a collective
bargaining relationship in place).
190. See supra notes 175-77 and accompanying text (noting that salary caps have
not been directly challenged in the ECJ).
191. See supra notes 21-31 and accompanying text (outlining the application of
antitrust law to sports in the United States).
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because of the non-statutory labor exemption. 92 Since virtually
all sports in the United States are conducted against the
backdrop of labor unions, the US Supreme Court has never had
the opportunity to actually decide the issue of whether a salary
cap structure, in the absence of a union, would survive rule of
reason analysis. 9 3 Although it never officially issued a holding
on the merits of an antitrust suit over salary caps, the Court
engaged in some very telling dicta in American Needle.194
Historically, the ECJ has declined to engage in rule of
reason analysis.'95 Recently, however, the court has been moving
towards a US-style rule of reason analysis, in which a court
balances the necessity of a restraint against its anti-competitive
effects.196 The ECJ should seize this opportunity to firmly
establish the goal of competitive balance as a legitimate and
important justification for a restraint of trade, like the United
States has done.'97 This is not to say that the ECJ should reinstate
the "purely sporting" exception, which it already explicitly
rejected.'98 To put regulations such as salary caps entirely
outside of the scope of competition law would be to overrule
Meca-Medina, and would go even further than the United States
has gone in granting immunity in various situations to sports
leagues.'99
By adjudicating the salary cap issue with guidance from the
Supreme Court's finding that competitive balance is a critical
interest, the ECJ could easily find that such an interest justifies
192. See supra notes 142-43 (citing cases in which the non-statutory labor
exemption obviated the court's need to address the legality of salary caps under
antitrust law).
193. See supra notes 67-73 (remanding the issue of salary under the rule of reason
to the district court).
194. See supra notes 73-76 (describing competitive balance as a legitimate and
important interest which could potentially overcome rule of reason analysis).
195. See supra notes 102-103 and accompanying text (examining the ECJ's stance
on the weighing of pro- and anti-competitive effects).
196. See supra notes 104-13 and accompanying text (commenting on the ECJ's
move towards a limited non-statutory labor exemption).
197. See supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text (recognizing competitive
balance as a legitimate league interest).
198. See supra notes 100-01 and accompanying text (rejecting the "purely
sporting exception" rule).
199. See supra notes 21-31, 104-08 and accompanying text (detailing the
application of US antitrust law to sports, and the holding of Meca-Medina).
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the anti-competitive nature of the restraint.200 Such a finding
would pave the way for UEFA, as well as all EU sports leagues, to
achieve financial stability and competitive balance. The result of
such achievements would be the improvement of the product
for all by increasing uncertainty in results while simultaneously
lowering the cost of producing sporting events.20
CONCLUSION
If UEFA wants to remain an economically viable
organization, it must maintain competitive balance.202 It has
attempted to do so by instituting salary caps.203 Despite
potentially running up against European competition law, it is
not inevitable that the ECJ will strike down the scheme. 20 4 If
UEFA decides to implement its salary cap structure via collective
bargaining with a labor union such as FIFPro Division Europe,
the ECJ may apply a non-statutory labor exemption.2o Even in
the absence of collective bargaining in the implementation of a
salary cap, the ECJ can still find that UEFA's interest in
competitive balance is sufficient to overcome the modified rule
of reason analysis that the ECJ has started employing in recent
years.206 Whichever route the ECJ elects to follow, it would be
well served to learn from the experience of its US counterparts,
and to find a way to immunize salary caps from competition
liability. The clock is ticking on UEFA's chances to implement a
salary cap, without which it may never be able to reign in
excessive costs. It is up to the ECJ to exempt salary caps from
competition law to maintain competitive balance and financial
200. See supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text (acknowledging the legitimacy
and importance of competitive balance to sports leagues).
201. See supra notes 3-8 and accompanying text (describing the benefits of salary
caps).
202. See supra notes 3-8 and accompanying text (discussing the importance of
competitive balance to the success of sports leagues).
203. See supra notes 136-38 and accompanying text (documenting the
introduction of a salary cap to UEFA).
204. SeeTFEU, supra note 77, art. 101, 2008 O.J. C 115/47, at 88.
205. See supra notes 95-98 and accompanying text (describing the European
version of the non-statutory labor exemption).
206. See supra notes 104-13 and accompanying text (establishing the ECJ's recent
trend towards a modified rule of reason analysis in sports competition litigation).
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viability within UEFA. The ball is in the ECJ's court; it is up to it
to draw up the right play.
